On 20 February 2003, a terrible tragedy occurred at the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Unapproved pyrotechnics were used as part of a show that the band Great White was putting on. The pyrotechnics were set off early into the show and ignited sound proofing polyurethane foam that was located on the ceiling and the walls proximal to the platform that the band was performing on. Within minutes of the ignition of the foam the building was consumed with fire and smoke. Egress was slowed by the majority of the occupants attempting to escape through the main entrance. One hundred people were killed in this fire. Fire safety inspections, NFPA codes and Ohio Fire Codes are considered in this paper in an effort to apply the lessons learned.
The Station Nightclub was built in 1946 as a night club and had several owners and remodels over the years. The structure was a single story wood frame building with a footprint of about 4484 square feet. The main entrance was located on the north side of the structure.
There was a door located on the west side adjacent to the platform (stage) area. Another door was located on the east end of the structure near the main bar area. Large windows were located on the north side of the structure on both sides of the main entrance. A forth door was located in the kitchen but would not have been known to anyone other then employees or someone familiar with the building.
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On the night of the fire the band Great White was performing. Included as part of their show were some pyrotechnics. These pyrotechnic devices were located on either side of the front of the platform. The pyrotechnics were ignited about thirty seconds into the show.
These pyrotechnics served as the heat source and the polyurethane soundproofing foam located on the ceiling and walls proximal to the platform served as the initial fuel. The wood paneling under the polyurethane foam was ignited and the fire spread into the structure. An estimated 95% of the fuel load was the wood structure and paneling. (NIST Final Report, 27 June 2005). After the foam was consumed the fire transitioned into a wood frame structure fire.
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Background and Significance
The focus of this research was to gain knowledge of the fire code enforcement and inspection procedures used by the West Warwick Fire Department. This papers intent is to serve as a learning aid with respect to code enforcement, fire inspection procedures and documentation. This paper is not intended to find fault or assign blame to any of the entities involved.
Problems faced by many fire departments are both code enforcement and fire safety inspections. These reports cannot be regarded as additional duties. I believe that the reports are generated, but the quality of the report is what is vital to success. It does not do any good to produce a negative report if no action is taken on them. Re-inspections must be done and enforced. They are paramount to the success of any department. Given the hazard mix of materials and the lack of sprinklers, the NIST report determined that the fire department could not have saved this structure. The fire department had its first arriving unit on scene in less then five minutes after the first 911 call.
A mass casualty plan was implemented within ten minutes and all occupants requiring medical treatment were evacuated within two hours.
A number of recommendations were put out as a result of the NIST final report of the Station Nightclub Fire. A strong emphasis was put on the adoption of and implementation of aggressive and effective fire inspections and code enforcement. The following items were targeted:
• Documentation of building permits and alterations 
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We must follow up on re-inspections. We are not just going through the motions when we inspect. Your actions have second and third order effects that could impact life, property and your career. It is vital that we complete the inspections and re-inspections and that we document them properly.
The use of pyrotechnics at the Station Nightclub was apparently not approved or authorized by anybody. A thought to keep in mind when inspecting businesses that operate at capacity mostly in the evening is to schedule an inspection during peak hours of operation. It will still be necessary to inspect when you can access the building more readily, but by inspecting at peak business time you can get a clearer picture of egress problems, occupant load and other code violations such as blocked exits for example. There is a long list of what the plan must include. Names, dates, qualifications, proof of insurance, proof of license, number and type of pyrotechnics to be used, diagrams of the area to be used, and MSDS. This means no free lancing. Strict adherence to the chain of command and assignments at a fire will be the best use of manpower. Duplication of effort and poor communications will certainly create more problems and cause incident resolution to be prolonged.
Ohio Fire Code Rule 33 Explosives and Fireworks Pyrotechnics (K) Section 3311 Pyrotechnics and Special Exhibition Permit

Public Building Record Keeping Practices
Communication is always one of the biggest challenges at incidents. When you factor in mutual aid assignments, it creates even more difficulty. Code use on the radio has by and large gone by the wayside, with the exception of a few safety codes. Clear concise communication, without the use of codes is the acceptable norm now.
Focus of Operations:
Operations should be making the larger, strategic decisions, including who to assign to various groups. Operations should not micromanage specific tactics. Once operations focus turns to specific tactics, he will lose site of the overall incident action plan.
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Everyone on the fire ground has a specific assignment, and they should be focusing on their specific assignment. Once focus is lost or those assigned tasks are distracted from, the original objective becomes blurred or lost. Operations must focus on strategic action plans.
Sector officers must employ specific tactics. (Coleman, 1997) At a mass casualty incident, Operations should focus on the extrication, triage, treatment and transportation of the victims. The majority of these tasks will be delegated to other on-scene officers.
A medic should be in charge of triage, treatment and transport. A fire officer should be in charge of extrication efforts.
Operations role is to ensure for Command that the needs of the victims and emergency crews are being met. Command should focus on other scene functions and or delegate them to others. Span of control is what always needs to be kept in mind. Typically the number of people one person can effectively manage is 4-7.
Most large incidents are going to require the establishment of the (IMS) Incident Management System. Within each of these sections there are various subsections. Each of the subsections carries out different but integral tasks. Again, the importance of span of control cannot be overstated.
Conclusion:
The lessons learned from this tragic fire are that fire safety inspections and code enforcement must be a priority within our fire department organization. In this paper I have shown how the lack of follow up and documentation can lead to disaster. The untreated polyurethane foam was never approved for use in the Station.
The Station Nightclub Fire 18
Inspections previous to the incident never mandated The Station to remove the foam either. The pyrotechnics that ignited the polyurethane foam were never approved by the fire department. The town and the state both had no documentation whatsoever, which showed prior approval of either the untreated polyurethane foam or the pyrotechnics used in the show.
We, as an organization, must know our district. We must keep our district safe. Never lose sight of the fact that we are the first line of defense. By maintaining quality fire safety inspections and enforcing codes to our limit authorized, we can impact the community in ways that will never be known because we have prevented disaster.
